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Abstract:
The recent reform of the English National Health Service (NHS) through the  Health and Social
Care Act of 2012 introduced important changes in the organization, management, and provision of
public health services in England. This study aims to analyze the NHS reforms in the historical
context of predominance of neoliberal theories since 1980 and to discuss the “liberalization” of the
NHS.  The  study  identifies  and  analyzes  three  phases:  (i)  gradual  ideological  and  theoretical
substitution  (1979-1990)  –  transition  from  professional  and  health  logic  to  management  and
commercial  logic;  (ii)  bureaucracy  and  incipient  market  (1991-2004)  –  structuring  of  the
bureaucracy  focused  on  administration  of  the  internal  market  and  expansion  of  pro-market
measures; and (iii) opening to the market, fragmentation, and discontinuity of services (2005-2012)
– weakening of the territorial health model and consolidation of health as an open market for public
and private providers. This gradual but constant liberalization has closed services and restricted
access, jeopardizing the system’s comprehensiveness, equity, and universal healthcare entitlement
in the NHS.
Keywords: Health Systems; Health Services; Health Policy; Health Programs and Plans
Resumo:
A recente reforma do Serviço Nacional de Saúde (NHS) inglês por meio do Health and Social Care
Act de  2012  introduziu  mudanças  importantes  na  organização,  gestão  e  prestação  de  serviços
públicos de saúde na Inglaterra. O objetivo deste estudo é analisar as reformas do NHS no contexto
histórico de predomínio de teorias neoliberais desde 1980 e discutir o processo de “liberalização”
do NHS.  São identificados  e  analisados  três  momentos:  (i)  gradativa  substituição  ideológica  e
teórica  (1979-1990)  –  transição  da  lógica  profissional  e  sanitária  para  uma  lógica
gerencial/comercial; (ii) burocracia e mercado incipiente (1991-2004) – estruturação de burocracia
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voltada à administração do mercado interno e expansão de medidas pró-mercado; e (iii) abertura ao
mercado, fragmentação e descontinuidade de serviços (2005-2012) – fragilização do modelo de
saúde  territorial  e  consolidação  da  saúde  como  um  mercado  aberto  a  prestadores  públicos  e
privados.  Esse  processo  gradual  e  constante  de  liberalização  vem  levando  ao  fechamento  de
serviços e à restrição do acesso, comprometendo a integralidade, a equidade e o direito universal à
saúde no NHS.
Palavras-chave: Sistemas de Saúde; Serviços de Saúde; Política de Saúde; Planos e Programas de
Saúde
Resumen:
La reciente reforma del Servicio Nacional de Salud (NHS) inglés a través de la Health and Social
Care Act de 2012 introdujo cambios importantes en la organización, gestión y prestación de los
servicios de salud pública en Inglaterra. El objetivo de este estudio es analizar las reformas del NHS
en el contexto histórico del predominio de las teorías neoliberales desde 1980 y discutir el proceso
de “liberalización” del NHS. Fueron identificados y se analizaron tres momentos: (i) sustitución
gradual ideológica y teórica (1979-1990) -transición de la lógica profesional y de salud para una
lógica de gestión/negocio; (ii) la burocracia y el mercado incipiente (1991-2004) -estructuración de
la burocracia dedicada a la gestión del mercado interior y la expansión de las medidas pro-mercado;
y (iii) la apertura del mercado, la fragmentación y la discontinuidad de los servicios (2005-2012)
-fragilización del modelo de salud territorial y consolidación de la salud como un mercado abierto
para los proveedores públicos y privados. Este proceso gradual y constante de la liberalización ha
provocado el  cierre  de los  servicios  y la  restricción  del  acceso,  comprometiendo la  integridad,
justicia y derecho universal a la salud en el NHS.
Palabras-clave: Sistemas de Salud; Servicios de Salud; Política de Salud; Planes y Programas de
Salud
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The British Parliament’s approval of the Health and Social Care Act 1 in 2012 was a milestone in
the history of international public health in the new millennium  2.  The National Health Service
(NHS) is acknowledged as one of the most efficient and accessible state systems in the West and
was a pioneer in universal access to health services and hierarchical organization of an evidence-
based  system  of  healthcare  and  primary  care  3.  Maintained  by  public  taxes,  the  NHS and  its
principles  date  to  1948.  At  a  favorable  historical  moment  for  the  concepts  of  universal,  free
coverage, under Labour Party aegis, the NHS was established as part of the Welfare System that
leveraged the United Kingdom’s socioeconomic recovery in a politically polarized post-World War
II scenario 4.
Despite sharing values and denomination, since 1999 each member country of the United Kingdom
has an independent national health system: NHS Scotland, NHS Northern Ireland, NHS Wales, and
NHS England. The  Health and Social Care Act 2012  1 only regulates the reform of the English
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health system, responsible for the healthcare of 53.5 million people. The Act of Parliament scarcely
modified  services  from the population’s perspective,  since access  to  healthcare  was not  altered
immediately. While  maintaining  public  financing via  taxes,  the system underwent  an  extensive
internal  reform that  may affect  the  universal  right  to  health.  Mediated  by  the  new legislation,
previously incipient processes of healthcare’s organizational fragmentation in the administrative,
institutional, and especially financial  areas (vis-à-vis public spending) were radically intensified,
multiplying the intermediaries between purchasers and providers of services. Although the NHS has
undergone administrative reforms since it  was founded in 1948, the 2012 proposal deepens the
system’s liberalization,  both  in  the  reform’s underlying  theoretical  basis  and  its  administrative
measures:  structural  changes  in  the  health  system;  demise  of  social  consensus  in  the  Welfare
System; defense of the market’s legitimacy for meeting social demands via downsizing the state’s
role 5,6; and stimulus for pro-market organizational elements within the public administration.
Why could administrative changes in the English NHS be significant for a large share of the world’s
health  systems?  The  NHS  is  benchmark  for  universal  health  systems  and  symbolizes  (or
symbolized)  the  necessary limit  on the  market’s influence  for  guaranteeing  universal  access  to
health as a social right 5. NHS reforms are publicized quickly and influence health policy debates
and implementation in other countries.
Pioneering  public  health  systems  like  the  English  NHS  are  sensitive  to  the  hegemonic  social
theories prevailing in each historical conjuncture and express the historical moment in which they
occur. The creation of the NHS in the late 1940s allowed the consolidation of universal human
rights in the United Kingdom 7 in a political period of social and economic reconstruction of post-
War Europe. In the last 30 years, the NHS was modified beginning with the economic crises of the
1970s, under the influence of the conservative Margaret Thatcher government 8, shifting to Labour
in the late 1990s and returning to the Conservatives 2010. The current scenario reflects the force of
market relations that extend beyond commercial relations to influence the public services sector that
guarantees social rights 3. The current article intends to illustrate the theoretical links between the
successive  reforms in  the English  NHS, beginning with the  so-called  Thatcher  Era  (1979) and
combining analysis of the reforms with a broader conceptual discussion. Despite its relevance, the
theme has received scanty attention in the Brazilian literature 9,10,11, concentrated on specific aspects
or on analysis of reforms prior to 2012. The current article thus aims to help fill this gap.
This  article  aims  to  analyze  NHS  reforms  in  England,  discussing  the  system’s  growing
“liberalization” in this historical context of predominance of neoliberal theories since the 1980s 8.
Analysis of the reforms starts with the division proposed by Pollock 12, who defines this process as
privatization/breaking  up  of  the  NHS,  divided  into  four  periods  up  to  2003:  (i)  1980-1990
strangulation and the end of comprehensiveness; (ii) 1990-1997 the “internal market”; (iii) 1997-
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2000 continuous fragmentation under New Labour; and (iv) 2000-2003 pointing New Labour to a
“mixed healthcare economy” 12,13.
This article adapts the division proposed by Pollock. It expands the analysis by adding other authors
and the historical narrative, and extends the study to 2012. The periods of liberalization, which were
more components and moments in a process rather than chronological phases, are analyzed and
named according to their characteristics: (i) gradual ideological and theoretical substitution (1979-
1990)  –  transition  from professional  and  health  logic  to  a  management/commercial  logic;  (ii)
bureaucracy  and  incipient  market  (1991-2004)  –  structuring  of  the  bureaucracy  focused  on
administration of the internal market and expansion of pro-market measures; (iii) opening to the
market,  fragmentation,  and discontinuity  of services  (2005-2012) – weakening of  the territorial
health model and consolidation of health as an open market for public and private providers. The
“bureaucracy and incipient market” phase is organized in three chronological sub-periods that add
the last three stages from Pollock’s analysis 12.
The analysis includes characteristics of the NHS before and after the 2012 reform, as well as its
historical development (Figure 1). To situate the liberalization process, the article’s first section
summarizes some historical antecedents and characteristics of the English health system.
Antecedents: from social health insurance to the single, integrated
NHS
Social  stratification  and disordered urbanization  produced by England’s two Industrial  Reforms
provided fertile ground for the country’s pioneering trade unions; these in turn increased the social
pressure for better working conditions and health services in the early 20th century. Implementation
of the National Health Insurance in 1911 insured workers that made up to a given wage cap and
guaranteed  primary  medical  care,  without  hospital  coverage,  which  was  generally  provided  by
charitable  hospitals.  General  practitioners  (GPs)  worked  as  self-employed  physicians,  and
specialists in many cases worked for very low pay in hospitals. Some one-third of the population
was covered, with financing through social contributions by workers, employers, and government
14.
The  Beveridge Report of 1942, commissioned by the Conservative-Labour coalition government
during World War II, laid the theoretical foundations for the NHS and spearheaded the proposal of
redistributive social policies, the main objective of the Welfare State. The NHS began its activities
as a universal health system in 1948. Since its implementation the system has undergone reforms in
response  to  the  economic,  social,  and political  changes  over  the  decades,  intensified  since  the
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economic crises of the 1970s, plus increasing healthcare costs and complexity. The Departments of
Health  and Social  Security  were  unified  in  1968 as  the  UK Department  of  Health  and Social
Security.  The  system’s  local  organization  was  altered  in  1974  by  the  National  Health  Service
Reorganization Act in an attempt to promote greater integration among services, creating the local
health authorities. The purpose of these reforms was to decrease healthcare fragmentation, modify
the scenario of financial  favor for teaching hospitals,  and extend priority to services other than
hospitals for acute cases. Reform promoted the transition from a system of financing by institutions
to integrated services planning through Area Health Authorities (AHA), territorial organization, and
use of a needs-based resource allocation formula  15.  A methodology was established to measure
local health needs (Resource Allocation Working Party – RAWP), replacing the financial transfers
that followed historical averages. These changes innovated by improving the system’s efficiency
and equity and eventually influenced other countries’ health policies in subsequent decades 16.
The predominance of market theories in the social area began to gain shape and political influence
in England when Thatcher won the 1979 general elections. Previously, Labour governments had
sought  to  limit  the  market’s influence  in  some social  areas  like  health.  Favored  by the  global
economic crisis, the Conservatives’ scale-up to power marked the beginning of what we refer to as
liberalization of the English NHS.
When the Conservatives returned to government in the late 1970s, the NHS was a politically and
administratively centralized system (Table 1). Structurally speaking, hospitals were state property,
managed and financed by the state. NHS workers were salaried,  with the exception of GPs and
dentists, who worked as self-employed professionals  17 on a fulltime basis with the NHS. Funds
came  from the  Exchequer  and  were  administered  by  the  Department  of  Health.  The  fourteen
Regional  Health Authorities  were responsible  for managing health  services in a given territory,
executing  a  population-based  budget  to  provide  community  and  hospital  services.  Strategic
planning and management of community and hospital services were subdivided into 90 AHA and
205 district  management  teams.  Provision of primary care was monitored  by Family  Physician
Committees, financed directly by the Department of Health 17.
Gradual ideological and theoretical substitution (1979-1990)
The  Griffiths  Report of  1983,  commissioned  by  Thatcher,  made  harsh  criticisms  of  the  NHS
institutional  management,  launching a period of recommendations  and structural  changes in the
manner of corporate flowcharts  11,12. Rather than the horizontal administrative relations previously
characterizing  the  NHS,  the  report  established  hierarchical  boards,  similar  to  corporate
shareholders’ boards, and emphasized and valued the local service manager. As part of the new
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NHS management culture throughout the 1980s, the system administrator’s role gained increasing
importance.  Administrative  control  began  to  shift  away  from  health  professionals,  forcing  the
replacement of an organizational culture thitherto marked by health professionals’ influence and
leadership and the systematic use of epidemiological evidence with a typically managerial modus
operandi, common to the corporate environment 18.
During this period, in step with transformation of the prevailing organizational culture, there was a
first wave of health service outsourcing. Hospitals’ clinical activities were spared, but a large share
of  support  activities  was  outsourced,  including:  cleaning,  laundry,  nutrition,  and  general
maintenance. There was also a strategy to reduce coverage, charging fees for optometry services
(previously free), fee hikes for dental services, and closing of the majority of existing long-term
hospital beds in the NHS 11. Public hospitals were also encouraged to explore potential commercial
areas such as snack bars, charging for use of TV sets, telephone services, and car parks – items that
were  previously  free  for  NHS  users.  Such  services,  not  linked  directly  to  healthcare,  became
potential sources of financial gain for public institutions.
In addition to re-separation of the Departments of Health and Social Security in 1988, this initial
phase was heavily marked by the National Health Service and Community Care Act of 1990. This
reform came to be known in the literature as the Market Reform 12,18,19,20, since it opened specific
sectors of the system to private organizations and introduced the so-called internal market into the
NHS,  separating  the  acts  of  purchasing  and  providing  services  (the  purchaser/provider  split).
Purchasers  would  receive  funds  directly  from the  Department  of  Health,  and  providers  would
compete with each other to obtain funds and provide services, based on commercial contracts. The
theoretical  justification  for  the internal  market’s competitive  nature  was that  it  would offer  the
necessary  incentives  for  providers  to  improve  their  performance  (efficiency  and  response  to
demands). Financial and management decisions were decentralized, shifting from the central level
in the Department of Health to the local level, personified by purchasers and providers 17,21.
The  internal  market  was  structured  in  stages,  with  two  types  of  purchasers:  District  Health
Authorities (DHAs) and General Practitioners Fundholders (GPs were invited to manage budgets
and were called GP Fundholders – GP-FH). The GP-FH budget covered the provision of primary
care services per se and the purchase of secondary care services for their patient lists (average of
10,000 persons per GP group). DHAs were responsible for assessing the local population’s health
needs and acquiring the totality of hospital and community services for populations linked to non-
FH GPs. For the GP-FH, the DHAs were in charge of purchasing the non-commissioned part of
services (80%). Covering populations up to 200,000 persons, DHAs had a needs-adjusted per capita
population-based budget.
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Hospitals  and  community  health  services  became  independent  providers,  called  trusts,  with
financing that depended on contracts with the DHAs  17,21,22. With the development of the internal
market in this format, the DHAs were later replaced by the Health Authorities (HA), also in charge
of purchasing services for patients of GPs who had not joined the fundholding system 21.
The reform was so sweeping that it was echoed in the incipient Brazilian scientific literature on the
theme.  Akerman  9 asked  whether  the  creation  of  the  internal  market  in  the  late  Thatcher  Era
signaled the beginning of the end of the Welfare State or a daring management model, perhaps
alluding to the coming new century. Fomenting an internal market of purchasers and providers was
the  fundamental  administrative,  theoretical,  and  bureaucratic  change  in  this  initial  period  of
liberalization. Inserting the basic commercial act of purchasing and providing services internally did
not necessarily impact health services’ universal coverage. However, it did introduce competition
among organizations in the system and produced a fundamental organizational paradigm shift. This
change paved the way for the system’s subsequent liberalization. The internal market allowed the
later marketization and privatization of the NHS 18. The fundamental market principles proposed in
the  1990  reform  were  maintained  and  gradually  expanded,  despite  alternating  power  between
Conservatives and Labour in the following decades.
To stabilize a market relationship of purchase and sale of services between primary care, specialties,
and hospital care and the public budget 23, the system needed to adapt administratively to the new
reality, entering into a new liberalization phase.
Bureaucracy and incipient market (1991-2004)
The  recently  established  internal  market  of  the  NHS,  triggered  by  the  separation  between
purchasers/hirers  and  providers,  required  the  system’s  administrative  reorganization.  A  new
bureaucracy  was  shaped,  focused  on  administering  the  internal  market  and  the  proposed  new
contractual relationships. The entire English public sector drew closer to the business sector in the
1980s 24, with organizational and financial restructuring. The health sector followed this trend in the
1990s, turning its institutions into public companies. The state hospital trusts began to present cash
flow  statements,  balanced  budgets,  and  accounting  records  aimed  at  financial  return  and,  if
necessary, divestiture of goods and property to balance their books at the end of each fiscal year 12,25.
• Consolidating the internal market: John Major (1992-1997)
John  Major,  the  Conservative  Prime  Minister  that  replaced  Margaret  Thatcher,  took  charge  of
consolidating the internal market and combatting state bureaucracy in the NHS.
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Major’s government eliminated 14 HAs (a Labour legacy prior to Thatcher) and made adaptations
to the GP-FH model. To allow greater diversity in the provision of primary care, the possibility of
salaried payment for GPs was introduced 17. Several variants of GP-FH were developed, generally
promoted by managers and GPs that had not joined the FH model: Community fundholders, which
only purchased community services associated with primary healthcare; so-called Multi-funds, or
groupings  of  GP  fundholders  that  shared  the  management  of  their  budgets  and  respective
administrative costs of their purchases; Purchase Groups, in which collectives of GPs that did not
manage budgets acted with the HAs to influence purchase of services in their geographic areas of
care  22. GP-FH were implemented gradually to sidestep the initial rejection by physicians and to
keep a drastic change from destabilizing the NHS vis-à-vis the population. Adherence to the GP-FH
model enjoyed an initial wave of enthusiasts, followed by a wave of people interested in acting as
groups (Community fundholders and Multi-funds), and finally a third wave consisting of a cascade
effect from the proposed model’s growth 21. In 1996, 50% of the GPs had joined the fundholding
model  17,21.  Cost  containment  with  prescriptions  was  the  most  immediate  effect  of  the  GP-FH,
leading  to  government  incentives  to  induce  GPs  that  were  still  independent.  The  fundholding
models generally produced gains in the extent and effectiveness of services, but with increasing
administrative  expenses,  transaction  costs  between services,  and inequalities  in  access  between
users of different models (GPs in the fundholding model versus independents) 21,22.
The internal market encountered various structural difficulties. For purchasers, the GP-FH model
led to numerous small-scale, limited-scope purchasers whose purchasing power was insufficient to
impact  price  competition  in  the  local  health  services  market  15,22.  DHAs  also  faced  structural
obstacles that limited their performance as purchasers, such as: lack of demand-side integration;
lack of information for making purchases (incipient price system, leading to market asymmetry);
and local services monopolies 15,22.
Underfinancing of certain activities related to social needs and that involved long-term costs (e.g.,
care for the elderly) sparked negotiations over the definition of fundamental healthcare activities as
opposed to extra activities, not necessarily covered by the same budget 21.
State hospitals were turned into trusts, semi-independent, non-profit organizations with a reasonable
degree of freedom to set pay thresholds, staff composition, and types of services offered. By 1996
there were already 350 NHS Trusts 21.
In  short,  the  Conservative  reform  focused  on  the  system’s  efficiency,  assuming  that  market
competition would naturally increase the services’ quality and efficiency. The three basic principles
were:  provider/purchaser  split,  stimulus  for  entry  of  private  providers,  and  initiatives  for
administrative  decentralization,  in  response  to  bureaucratic  central  control  that  was  considered
unresponsive  6.  The  period  emphasized  health  services  consumption  through  an  approach  that
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required  greater  responsiveness  to  demands  and  power  to  choose  (Choice  Initiative),  and
management techniques from the private sector, to replace the public management model 6. With the
introduction of market mechanisms, citizens would be treated as consumers, amenable to making
consumption choices 17.
The model shaped in this intermediate phase in which liberalization of NHS began to materialize is
termed quasi-market  26. Health was not the only public sector affected: other sectors in which the
explicit  privatization of services faced social  rejection also became quasi-markets through these
modernizing reforms of the state apparatus. In such systems, the state provides the financing for
transactions,  demand  is  controlled  by  purchase  agents  indicated  by  the  state  itself  that  act  in
consumers’ place, and the service is finally provided by non-profit social organizations or public
companies that compete which each other to provide products 26,27.
According  to  Aldridge  27,  in  new  market  societies,  based  on  support  from neoliberal  political
leaders, traditional social institutions like hospitals and schools introduced market mechanisms in
their structures, treating citizens as clients or consumers. England is thus not an isolated case in this
period, but part of a global phenomenon.
• New Labour: the first Blair government (1997-2000)
This  period  was  marked  politically  by the  Conservative  demise  and the  rise  of  so-called  New
Labour  represented  by  Tony Blair.  Although  Labour  had harshly  criticized  the  Thatcher-Major
period, it did not abandon indispensable principles for liberalization of the NHS. Labour not only
maintained the purchaser/provider  split,  the internal  market’s mainstay, but reinforced corporate
culture within the system.
The founding of the Primary Care Groups (PCGs), later grouped into Primary Care Trusts (PCTs),
consolidated the split between purchasers and providers, universalizing the GP-FH model. By 1999,
all GPs were required to join one of the 481 PCGs, created by the New NHS Act of 1997. Still, the
return of  territorial  responsibility  centered  on the population’s health,  represented  by the PCGs
(PCTs, since 2000) and reinforcement of the budget focus in primary care were responses to the
GP-FH model’s failures and limitations. Meanwhile, starting in 2000, the introduction of trusts as a
legal  figure  in  the  Primary  Health  Care  as  well  and  the  creation  of  Foundation  Trusts  (FTs),
organizations with greater independence vis-à-vis central  government in the legal, financial,  and
performance areas, consolidated the predominance of the commercial-corporate ethos in healthcare
management and provision 6,15,17,18,21,22.
The  NHS Plan of 2000 inaugurated a period of steady financial support for the NHS and greater
emphasis on primary care through transformation of PCGs into PCTs 6,18. PCTs included all GPs in
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a given geographic area, covered some 200,000 persons, and were responsible for that population’s
healthcare  with  three  functions:  improve  health  (public  health);  commission/hire  and  purchase
health  services  (hospital  and  specialized);  provide  and  develop  primary  care  services  and
community health services (children with disabilities, mental health). As the NHS administrative
agency at the local level, PCTs were in charge of managing budgets sized by capitation, including
pharmaceutical expenditures, performing a broad role in commissioning specialized and hospital
services; and providing community and primary care services 17. In 2000 there were 17 PCTs, a year
later in 2001 there were 164, and by 2003 they had increased to 211, when the remaining PCGs
were turned into PCTs 18,22.
The HAs also underwent mergers, resulting in 28 Strategic Health Authorities (SHA). Once the
PCTs absorbed the entire extent of commissioning, the SHAs were in charge of strategic planning
and performance management for health organizations in the so-called “New NHS” 6,17,22.
Consolidation of this new structure encountered major problems. The main obstacles were initially
organizational development, teamwork, and management of the consequences of abolishing the GP-
FH. Later, improvement of primary care provision, access to care, and the extent of professionals’
roles became the focus of Labour policy 22. Limited management capacity and budget constraints in
the PCTs hindered the commissioning role and development of inter-sector work 22.
The  Department  of  Health  gradually  delegated  the  system’s  administrative  functions  to  new
organizations  established specifically  for  this  purpose.  These  featured  the National  Institute  for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE), created in 1999, initially responsible for health technologies
assessment, regulation of the incorporation of new medicines based on cost-benefit, and quality of
care, aimed at greater clinical efficiency in resource allocation 28. Its scope of action was gradually
expanded to include the proposal and revision of evidence-based clinical care guideline, solving
clinical problems posed by health services, and commissioning universities for research on relevant
questions for the system. The decision-making processes, functional organization, responsibilities,
and political strength of the NICE in relation to the Department of Health are constantly questioned
in the literature 29,30,31,32,33. Other institutions created in the same period and that took over functions
previously exclusive to the Department of Health were: Care Quality Commission (CQC), founded
in 2009 to regulate the independent portion of the health sector through licensing, annual inspection,
and quality improvement and performance assessment of NHS and independent organizations; the
Monitor, independent regulator of FTs, and the Health Protecting Agency, responsible for defending
public health interests.
The establishment of these organizations meant a transition to a regulatory model independent of
the Department of Health within the NHS 18. This period was marked by administrative delegation,
gradually  reducing  the  state’s central  responsibility  in  the  figure  of  the  Secretary  of  Health,  a
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position  equivalent  to  the  Minister  of  Health  in  the  Brazilian  executive  branch.  The  reformist
rhetoric  in  the  NHS  moved  from  competition  promoted  by  the  Conservatives  to  regulation
promoted by Labour 15.
A shift  away from traditional  population-based public  health  planning occurred with the state’s
retreat from responsibility vis-à-vis citizens, a clear sign of the theoretical paradigm in the NHS. In
keeping with the decrease in state responsibility for public health, there was a perceptible increase
in persons’ accountability for their own healthcare.
Due to the multiplicity of agencies and agents acting in the name of the Department of Health,
Jones  et  al.  34 argue  that  beyond  the  quasi-market,  the  NHS  shifted  from  a  hierarchical  and
bureaucratic  system to a  more complex network,  not  necessarily  hierarchical,  with the  internal
market and previous bureaucratic hierarchy existing side by side  35,36. A form of resistance to the
market reforms was the tacit agreement between some organizations to not compete with each other
resisting the reforms that appeared mainly in the first decade of the 2000s 34.
• Second Blair government: competition for targets and performance (2001-
2004)
Despite the administrative impact of the first wave of Labour reform starting in 1997, the problem
of waiting lists for elective procedures and public concern over quality in the NHS led to a second
wave of  reforms.  These  increased  regulatory  control  over  the  system,  introducing performance
targets and measures and further inciting participation by the private sector in the supply of services
37, aimed at competition by these providers with the public sector. Such measures by Labour were
considered a definitive overture by the NHS to market mechanisms, materialized in the achievement
of targets and performance by establishments not necessarily linked to the Department of Health’s
central  administration,  consolidating  the logic  of services  consumption/production  in  the public
system 38. Belief that the private sector could lead the way to greater efficiency in the public sector
directly influenced the second phase of the Labour period under Tony Blair. Previous Conservative
objectives  like plurality  of providers,  the possibility  of consumer choice,  and competition  were
resumed and implemented practically by direct private provision. This period was characterized by
Labour’s introduction of the private ethos and status for NHS providers 6,15,39.
One basic policy in the second Labour phase was the introduction of Payment by Results (PbR),
similar to the Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) system in Medicare in the United States, a strategy
that  proposed that  financing would  follow the  user  15,17.  In  practice  it  consisted  of  payment  to
providers for activities, incrementing the values according to results, forcing competition for better
quality  rather  than  a  price  competition  system.  Implementation  of  this  process  resulted  in
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prioritization  of  easier-to-bill  procedures  with  the  possibility  of  larger  volume,  jeopardizing
complex care for patients with chronic conditions, besides failing to guarantee quality improvement
40,41. Another strategy was Choice Initiative: supported by the discourse of expanding users’ choice,
it promoted provider diversification, allowing private initiative’s entry into services provision. The
supply of a private provider among the alternatives became commonplace in cases of referrals for
specialized care 17,39.
Backed by the discourse of improving quality in healthcare provision, Labour was not detained by
ideological or organizational barriers to develop and implement Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), a
direct recourse to intermediation of private investments in the NHS Trusts 15,17. The PFIs, conceived
in the early 1990s during the Conservative government,  allowed consortia of private companies
(like construction companies,  general services companies,  and banks) to raise funds (by issuing
shares and taking out loans) in order to build and operate installations with public functions, like
hospitals. Hospitals, in turn, would rent these installations (private property), including maintenance
services  and support  teams,  for  25-30-year  periods.  The companies  would profit  through these
consortia with guaranteed long-term financial, and government could build new hospitals without
incurring immediate budget outlays or increasing taxes. The Labour government adhered to this PFI
strategy in its initial years, presenting a project for expanding the number of hospitals belonging to
the NHS. The policy outlined in the Delivering the NHS Plan of 2002 projected expansion of the
hospital network through the PFIs, consolidating the Labour government’s pro-market tendencies 12.
In the broader scenario of opening health services to private initiative in European Union member
countries, this process can also be seen as a state policy to favor British companies in the emerging
international health market 13.
In short, Labour government retained the internal market created by the Conservatives, shifting the
emphasis from competition to cooperation with performance-centered management. Recourse to an
alternative vocabulary – the rhetoric of cooperation and regulation – allowed avoiding allegations of
connections  to  throwbacks  from the  Thatcher  era  6,39.  But  the  introduction  of  mechanisms  for
institutional  competition  to  promote  changes  reinforced the  previous  tendency to  transform the
state’s role from financer/provider  to financer/regulator  5,42.  The Conservatives’ market  rationale
persisted in reforms by Labour, steadily expanding the acceptable limits of reform from the public
sector’s point of view. The private sector’s involvement increased, resulting in steady erosion of the
limits between the two sectors in health services provision 5,42.
Pollock’s analysis dates to 2004, drawing this period to a close 12. The author already concluded that
the NHS was drawing closer to the private sector as never before, a process that continued in the
subsequent phase, analyzed next.
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Market opening, fragmentation, and discontinuity of services (2005-2012)
The third stage in the liberalization of the NHS was the system’s actual opening to the market,
peaking in the Health and Social Care Act of 2012. Previously the Practice Based Commissioning
(PBC) policy beginning in 2005 had reintroduced the possibility of GP groups managing budgets to
purchase services and implement standardized care plans. PBC also included peer review of GP
referrals,  contradictorily  restricting  the  freedom  of  individual  characteristics  in  these  same
healthcare  plans.  PBC meant  internal  decentralization  of  the  PCTs,  simultaneously  turning  the
previously  cooperative  ties  between  primary  and  secondary  care  into  competitive  relations  6,43,
serving as an administrative embryo for implementation of the Clinical  Commissioning Groups
(CCGs) in the 2012 reform.
The actual opening of the health system to the market was the extinction of the basic territorial
health models (PCTs) in favor of the CCGs and the possibility of private entities selling services in
the name of the NHS, changes allowed by the Health and Social Care Act of 2012, the apogee of
the public health service liberalization initiated by Thatcher in 1979. While the intermediate phase
of liberalization concentrated on the system’s commercial and administrative bureaucratization, the
interstices between this phase and the new legislation of 2012 was marked by the gradual shifting of
so-called soft services to legally private entities:  administration of routine data produced by the
system  (Health  and  Social  Care  Information  Centre),  pathology  and  radiology  services,
administrative services, and commissioning of scientific research 44,45.
The  Health and Social  Care Act of  2012 potentially  modifies  government  obligations  and was
considered a waiver by the English government, represented by the Minister of Health, in taking
mandatory responsibility for providing comprehensive/integral health services, putting an end to so-
called duty of care (the equivalent of the right to health as a duty of the state,  provided in the
Brazilian Constitution). Although this waiver has not materialized immediately as changes in health
services’ routine practice,  other provisions of the new law effectively open the way for private
entities  (such as  support  services  for  CCGs in  the  purchase  of  specialized  and hospital  health
services)  to  determine  the  scope  of  procedures  to  be  purchased,  controlling  the  supply.
Simultaneously  with  this  weakening  of  guaranteed  access  to  services  and  their  scope,  another
fundamental  change is  the  abandonment  of  the  geographic  criterion  as  the  basis  for  allocating
resources and structuring services. The CCGs become responsible only for the patients registered in
their client lists rather than for all the residents in a given territory, except for emergency services.
This means not only that a CCG does not have to purchase health services for a given region’s
population,  but  that  it  can  count  on  patients  from other  regions  in  its  registered  patients  list,
whatever the geographic distance. A similar process (with separate legislation) applies to primary
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care, with the suspension of geographic limits as a factor limiting GP choice. The result of this
change in practice is that both GPs and CCGs can compete throughout England for patients/clients
for their respective services. Under this new format, resource allocation becomes highly complex,
and  population-based  allocative  mechanisms  are  no  longer  useful  due  to  elimination  of  the
geographic criterion. Under the new structure, budgets based on the size of the “client portfolios”
are  similar  to  the  sickness  fund models  of  Continental  Europe and private  health  insurance  in
general.  Such  models  commonly  lead  to  risk  selection,  co-payments,  and  the  need  to  acquire
complementary insurance 46.
Under the NHS legislation passed in 2012, the purchasers of services, CCGs, manage the budgets
and  are  subordinated  to  NHS  England  (initially  called  the  NHS  Commissioning  Board),  the
organization that regulates and oversees the CCGs. All GPs must join a CCG, and the services to be
purchased are provided by the Foundation Trusts (administrators of the former public hospitals), as
well as by “any qualified provider” of health services. On the providers’ side, the regulatory and
supervisory entities are the Monitor and the Quality Care Commission, the mission of which is to
maximize  the  respective  providers’  autonomy,  while  stimulating  competition.  Pollock  et  al.  46
highlight that the regulatory entities have limited sanctioning power and that the relations between
purchasers and providers become commercial contracts and no longer agreements with the public
sphere of the NHS 46. Such changes have serious implications, since they expose the NHS to legal
precedents to guarantee competition in international economic and trade agreements 46.
Extensive administrative decentralization in the new NHS following the 2012 reform, plus waiver
of the previous territorial budget planning logic, poses a risk to equity in the English health system.
First,  the CCGs have limited  capacity  to  exercise  commissioning activity  with  a  view towards
equity. Maintenance of equity in a universalist health system like the NHS requires the production
and analysis of population data, which the CCGs have neither the conditions to generate nor the
responsibility  to  analyze.  The professionals  qualified  for the task are  the public  health  experts.
Following  decentralization  of  public  health  activities,  they  work  in  the  local/municipal
governments,  not in the CCGs. Besides, local  governments’ administrative jurisdiction does not
coincide with that of the CCGs. In addition, a system with multiple independent purchasers, with
little  capacity  to  influence  providers’  behavior,  poses  risks  to  health  services’  supply/demand
balance 4.
The main characteristic of this third phase of liberalization is the legal crystallization of the shift
from a risk-sharing culture to the institutional organization of payment for the act of assuming the
risk, similar to the logic of private health insurance in the United States  46. The main source of
financing is still public, but providers are not necessarily public entities as before. As long as they
are properly registered and meet the legal requirements, any private entity can compete to supply
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health services in the liberalized NHS 13. For the first time in the system’s history, Foundation Trusts
Hospitals can generate up to 49% of the revenue from provision of services to private patients,
previously limited by law. Another precedent is the possibility of discontinuing services that are not
in the provider’s interest, directly affecting the system’s universality.
In  the  European  Union,  the  local  and  international  context  is  marked  by  the  controversial
immigration  issue.  Warfare  in  the  Middle  East  sparked  the  resurgence  of  xenophobic  social
movements, threatening “illegal” and socially disadvantaged European immigrants, especially from
Eastern  European  countries,  straining  universal  entitlement  in  Central  European  countries.  The
“Brexit” issue (whether the United Kingdom will exit or remain in the European Union), expressed
in the national referendum in 2016, relates to these processes. Meanwhile, the global financial crisis
has resulted directly in the fiscal austerity proposed by the EU, such that member countries decrease
the public revenue in social sectors, jeopardizing access to health again.
Final remarks
The establishment of the internal market, transformation of the relationship between financers and
providers, corporate management, and liberalization of the NHS for private providers are part of a
global historical, economic, and political context that affects universal entitlement.
The article addressed the effects of economic liberalism on the right to health in the NHS. Although
technically  complex,  the  reforms  reflect  the  contemporary  influence  of  market  theories  and
economic globalization, with a turnaround in social services in the last two decades of the 20th
century. The article emphasizes the reduction in the state’s role as provider and an increase in its
regulatory action. There has been an institutional retreat from humanist risk-sharing theories and
solidarity that formed the basis for the creation of the British NHS following World War II. In the
process,  corresponding concepts  and practices  such as  competition  between  providers,  services
commissioning, and responsibility for user lists rather than by geographic area (de-territorialization)
are included in the system as part of public health policy.
The health  market in England, previously incipient,  tends to expand, making the public system
hybrid as relates to the mix of state establishments and private services, gradually channeling public
resources to private entities. State responsibility for the population’s health is thereby restricted. As
part of the new bureaucracy needed for a system closer to the market, fundamental changes are
occurring in the collection and processing of epidemiological data routinely produced by the system
44,45,  affecting  the  planning,  evaluation,  and  production  of  fundamental  health  indicators  for
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individual and collective curative and preventive actions. Such changes jeopardize classical public
health action based on epidemiological, demographic, and territorial criteria.
The analysis of the liberalization of NHS in phases, initially proposed by Pollock 12 and Pollock &
Price  47 and  explored  in  this  article,  facilitates  the  understanding  of  a  complex  political  and
administrative process, focused in the ultimate analysis on the change in the public ethos of the
NHS. A health system that originated as part of a redistributive social policy, guaranteeing universal
entitlement, has gradually become part of a mechanism for exploiting services, oriented towards
extracting profit in a commercial relationship with the use of health services. As in any commercial
relationship, situations that tend not to favor dividends are rejected by financers, leading to financial
unfeasibility and closing of services, already observed in the first years following the 2012 reform
48.
The principal and most serious consequence of the gradual but steady liberalization of the NHS as a
whole is the restriction of universal entitlement. This restriction materializes in barriers to access to
health and discretionary reduction of coverage by CCGs in services supply and commissioning. The
reforms also involve stratification of the population clientele by risk selection, abandonment of the
territorialized  planning and healthcare  model,  and separation  of  individual  care from collective
actions. Expanded control of access to secondary services leads to closing of unprofitable services,
undermining the comprehensiveness  of care  49.  Cutbacks and closing of services have occurred
since 2013, and some cases are still pending in the UK Supreme Court 48.
Liberalization of the English NHS is still under way. The NHS is one of the developed countries’
most efficient and effective systems. Countries that spend more on health, like the United States,
still  display worse health indicators, despite their high budget. Support for the NHS as a public
system remains high in the English population, who consider it a “national treasure”, a symbol of
social pride displayed in the opening ceremony of the London Olympic Games in 2012.
The  British  system  is  an  international  historical  reference  for  health  entitlement,  prioritizing
universality, and organizing a system with primary care as the portal of entry with case-resolution
capacity, acting in cooperation with other sectors of care to ensure comprehensive healthcare. Such
administrative reforms, part of an adverse political and economic context, interpose market logic in
clinical and epidemiological reasoning in management decisions, thereby jeopardizing the reason
for being of the public health system itself: the population’s universal right to care and prevention.
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Table 1: Characteristics of English Nationa Health Service (NHS) England before and after
liberalization.
Characteristics NHS pre-liberalization NHS post-liberalization
Financing Public (taxes) Public (taxes); Private (PFI investments)
Financial allocation Defined by: Geographic area; Population
characteristics; Health needs
Defined by: Clinical Commissioning Groups
decisions based on specific clinical demands of
registered clients; List of registered clients per
GP; Commissioning
Services provision Cooperative combined provision between
different areas of healthcare; State
ownership; Salaried payment in specialized
and hospital sector; GP: capitation payment
per population covered; Financing in bloc;
High complexity services exclusively public
Competition between services based mainly on
cost-effectiveness models; Independence
between services previously combined in
collaborative/complementary fashion;
Overlapping supply; GP local budget
proportional to productivity indicators based on
diagnosis-related groups; Stimulus for health
market independent from NHS through
incentives for private participation for services
with waiting lists – private commissioning with
public financing (mainly for elective
procedures)
System management Health Planning Authorities: Primary,
secondary, and tertiary services defined
hierarchically by geographic area; Legal
responsibility of the Secretary of Health
Regulatory agencies (NICE, CQC, HSCIC,
Monitor); Shared/obscure legal responsibility
(elimination of Secretary of Health’s duty of
care); Individualized management focused on
GP clients list
Emphasis on administrative control Social control: Department of Health;
Health professionals; Users
Corporate control: Shareholders; Management
boards; Department of Health decentralized in
independent agencies
CQC: Care and Quality Commission; GP: General Practitioners; HSCIC: Health and Social Care Information Centre;
NICE: National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; PFI: Private Finance Initiatives.
Source: Prepared by authors, adapted from and based on Pollock 12, Pollock & Price 13,47, and Pollock et al. 46,48.
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Figure 1: Schematic history of the National Health Service (NHS) and its subsequent phases of
liberalization.
CCG: Clinical Commissionning Groups; CQC: Care and Quality Commission; GP: General Practitioners; NICE:
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; PCT: Primary Care Trusts.
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